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Chidi Oguamanam* Regime Tension1 in the Intellectual
Property Rights Arena: Farmers'
Rights and Post-TRIPS Counter
Regime Trends
Recognizing the transitions that have occurred in the global intellectual property
arena since the TRIPS Agreement, this article identifies and examines key sites of
the counter regime trends in intellectual property rights with a focus on farmers'
rights. It invokes farmers' rights to highlight the conceptual and juridical hurdles
facing the new issue-linkages that propel attempts to redress the shortcomings of
the TRIPS' trade-centred approach to intellectual property. The author argues that
the existingjuridical framework for farmers 'rights, especially under the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), although
inchoate, is stymied and not competent to realize the expectations underlying
those rights. The notion of farmers' rights would be better promoted under the
canopy of the more unifying framework of other post-TRIPS counter-regime
trends, especially the protection of the bio-cultural knowledge of indigenous and
local communities, pursuant to the framework Convention on Biological Diversity.
Reconnaissant les changements qui se sont produits sur la scene mondiale en
mati6re de propriet6 intellectuelle depuis la signature de lAccord sur les aspects
des droits de propri6t6 intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce (Accord sur les
ADPIC), I'article definit et examine des points cl6s des tendances contradictoires
relativement aux droits de propriet6 intellectuelle, s'arr6tant particulierement
aux droits des agriculteurs. II parle des droits des agriculteurs pour illustrer
les questions conceptuelles et juridiques qu'il faut r~soudre pour combler les
lacunes de I'approche de la proprietd intellectuelle preconisde par lAccord sur
les ADPIC, soit une approche ax6e sur le commerce. L'auteur allegue que le
cadre juridique actuel des droits des agriculteurs, en particulier sous le regime
du Trait6 international sur les ressources phytog6n6tiques pour I'alimentation et
I'agriculture, m~me si le cadre est imparfait, est contrecarre et ne permet pas de
r6aliser les attentes souleves par ces droits. La notion de droits des agriculteurs
serait mieux defendue J l'intdrieur du cadre plus unificateur d'autres tendances
qui ont 6merg6 a la suite de la conclusion de I'Accord, en particulier la protection
des connaissances traditionnelles des collectivit~s autochtones et locales dans
les domaines de la biologie et de la culture, dans le cadre Convention sur la
diversit6 biologique.
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Introduction
In 1986, industrialized countries, led by the United States, incorporated
regulation of intellectual property into the international trade negotiations
of the World Trade Organization (WTO).2 This initiative resulted in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS),3 one of the 28 agreements produced by the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the WTO.4 Backed by the WTO
dispute settlement and enforcement apparatus, TRIPS today is the most
authoritative global regime on intellectual property regulation.'
The shift of international intellectual property from the traditional
supervised framework of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO)6 into the international trade arena of the WTO is catalytic of
current debates and tensions surrounding intellectual property. The
tensions are exacerbated by a combination of circumstances implicated
in the underlying ideology of the TRIPS Agreement7 vis-A-vis the original
WIPO framework. These include the radical and far-reaching nature
of the changes in intellectual property in terms of both ideological and
conceptual details, the circumstances under which the TRIPS Agreement
I. "Regime tension" is used loosely in this article in reference to the general character of the
international intellectual lawmaking landscape consequent to the phenomenon of the "regime shift" in
the intellectual property arena occasioned by the TRIPS Agreement and other counter regime trends
post-TRIPS. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. For an elaborate treatise on regime shift in
intellectual property which is endorsed in this article, see Laurence Heifer, "Regime Shifting: The
TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Lawmaking" (2004) 29 Yale J. Int'l L. I at
14 [Heifer, "Regime Shifting"]; see also the following: Marney L. Cheek, "The Limits of Informal
Regulatory Cooperation in International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime"
(2001) 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 277; Ruth L. Okediji, "The International Relations of Intellectual
Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System"
(2003) 7 Sing. J.I.C.L. 315 [Okediji, "Developing Country Participation"], Peter K. Yu, "Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime" (2004) 38 Loyola of Los Angeles
L. Rev. 323, Ruth L. Okediji, "Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual
Property Protection" (2004) 1 University of Ottawa Law and Technology Journal 125.
2. Deliberations over the TRIPS Agreement as part of the renewed rounds of GATT/WTO
negotiations which culminated in the formation of the WTO as a successor to the GATT commenced
in Punta del Este in 1986 and were concluded in the Uruguay Rounds in 1994.
3. WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197, online: WTO <www.wto.org/english/tratop e/tripse/tagmo e.htm> [TRIPS].
4. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 3.
5. See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns The Knowledge
Economy? (New York: The New Press, 2002) at 12 [Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism].
6. See The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 14 July 1967,
828 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended 28 September 1979).
7. Underlying ideology is used narrowly here in reference to TRIPS' insensitivity or nonchalant
outlook on social and public welfare considerations in intellectual property jurisprudence and, to some
extent, in reference to the agreement's negative effects in a number of respects, including enclosure of
policy space, undue emphasis on "commodity logic" and the issue of democratic deficit in the WTO
process.
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was concluded, and the emerging trends of the post-TRIPS era. Others
are the pivotal nature of intellectual property in the current transition to a
knowledge-based economy spurred by two major technological revolutions
of the twentieth century - digital and biotechnologies 8 - and the complicity
of globalization in the timing of the regime shift9 in intellectual property.
The combination of the above circumstances and the disenchantment
over the perceived democratic deficit in the making of the TRIPS
Agreement 10 are implicated in the extant tension and resistance in
international intellectual property lawmaking. The resistance is championed
mainly by developing countries, non-governmental and civil society
organizations and intergovernmental bodies interested in moderating the
overarching trade-based ideology of TRIPS and its consequences mainly
for those countries. By a strategy of issue linkage, these interest groups
press for the diversification of the conceptual framework of intellectual
property to accommodate mostly new areas undermined by the TRIPS
Agreement, such as biodiversity and indigenous knowledge, public health
and human rights, and plant genetic resources for food and agriculture to
mention a few.
The transfer of intellectual property to the trade arena is driven by
"commodity logic"" which compromises or stymies the social interest
ideology with which the developing countries approached intellectual
property issues before TRIPS. In the trade arena, intellectual property
is deployed in a manner that relegates social interest considerations,
imposes artificial scarcity on information, inflates its price, distorts the
balance between public and private claims to knowledge in favor of the
latter, supervises the plunder of the commons, and shuns the diffusion of
8. See Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 10.
9. Helfer articulates the concept of regime shift "as an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving
treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from one international venue
to the other" in a manner that "provides an opportunity [or opportunities] to generate "counterregime
norms" - binding treaty rules and nonbinding soft law standards that seek to alter the prevailing
legal landscape" (footnotes omitted); see Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 14; see generally
Cheek, supra note 1.
10. See Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at c. 12; see also Heifer, "Regime
Shifting," supra note 1 at 20-1. See generally John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Global Business
Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [Braithwaite & Drahos, Global].
11. Commodity logic perceives knowledge not as a public good but as a private one. It de-emphasizes
the notion of knowledge as a common heritage and shrinks the sphere of public domain and social
policy. Under that logic, intellectual property is the major incentive for productivity, one that guarantees
return to investment in which knowledge can be privatized and commodified for trade under the market
economy. See James Thuo Gathii, "Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic" (2002)
14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 261 at 309 [Gathii]. See generally, Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
supra note 5; Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, eds., International Public Goods And Transfer
Of Technology Under Globalized Intellectual Property Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005) [Maskus & Reichman, International Public Goods].
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knowledge in preference to its conditional rationing.'I These translate into
human rights crises, escalating social tensions in developing countries,
and the fostering of a continuing culture of suspicion and distrust between
developing and developed countries in the global constitutive process.
Recognizing the transitions that have occurred in the intellectual
property arena under the aegis of the WTO following the coming into force
of the TRIPS Agreement, this article identifies and examines key sites of the
counter regime trends in intellectual property rights. It highlights farmers'
rights, in admittedly moderate detail, situating them within the framework
of the several complex issues jostling under the counter regime umbrella.
Even though the phenomenon of farmers' rights does not seem to be
directly implicated in the extant tension in the intellectual property regime,
I argue that the TRIPS Agreement provides impetus for the farmers' rights
movement as part of the counter regime dynamic. Specifically, this paper
uses farmers' rights to highlight the conceptual and juridical hurdle facing
the new issue linkages that propel attempts to redress the shortcomings of
the TRIPS' trade-centred approach to intellectual property.
Faulting the emerging and rather ambiguous conceptualization of
farmers' rights jurisprudence, I favour the incorporation of farmers'
rights into the broader or perhaps more potentially unifying framework of
other counter regime trends, especially the protection of the bio-cultural
knowledge of indigenous and local communities under the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD)."3 I argue that, on its own, the existing
juridical framework for farmers' rights, especially under the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resourcesfor Food andAgriculture (ITPGRFA), 4
although inchoate, is stymied and not competent to realize the expectations
underlying those rights.
The paper is divided into four parts. Part I elaborates the international
economic and legal backdrop of the TRIPS Agreement. Part II explores
factors underlying the counter regime pressure in international intellectual
property lawmaking, implicating the globalization phenomenon in the
process. Part III identifies and discusses a few principal sites or domains
of counter regime trends in the post-TRIPS intellectual property arena,
12. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, "The Globalization of Private Knowledge and the
Privatization of Global Public Goods" in Maskus & Reichman, International Public Goods, ibid. at
41 [Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization"] (arguing that "aggregate investments in R&D depend on
private intellectual property rights, especially patents, which deliberately restrain trade ").
13. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological
Diversity, (5 June 1992), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [CBD].
14. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 3 November
2001, online: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations <http://www.fao.org/AG/
cgrfa/itpgr.htm#text> [ITPGRFA]. The ITPGRFA opened for signature on November 3, 2001. It came
into force on June 29, 2004 following 54 ratifications.
418 The Dalhousie Law Journal
namely biodiversity and indigenous knowledge, public health and human
rights.
Part IV draws plant genetic resources (PGRs) for food and agriculture
into the counter regime analysis. In an attempt to situate farmers' rights
within the matrix of the intellectual property regime, Part IV begins with a
cursory overview ofthe quasi-intellectual property regime ofPlant Breeders'
Rights (PBRs) under the enabling juridical instrument, the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). 5 It also
notes how, beyond UPOV, TRIPS incorporates and affirms the extension
of intellectual property rights to PGRs, universalizing the sphere of
application and legitimacy of PBRs and related interests across the WTO
membership. Thus, the co-option of sui generis options for the protection
of PGRs, including PBRs, into TRIPS and their consequent empowerment
within the framework of the WTO enforcement apparatus provide the
impetus for farmers' rights as a counter regime initiative.
The current highpoint of farmers' rights jurisprudence is found in
ITPGRFA provisions. Even though these provisions antedate the TRIPS
Agreement, they have a post-TRIPS impact. The last section of Part IV
explores closely, even if briefly, the notion of farmers' rights. It highlights
the phenomenon's underlying conceptual difficulties as part of the overall
challenge inherent in the counter-hegemonic nature of general attempts
to re/address the social policy deficit in the trade-based ideology of the
intellectual property regime under the TRIPS Agreement. Given the
weakness inherent in farmers' rights, especially within the rubric of the
qualifications in ITPGRFA, significant doubts exist about the realization of
their underlying objectives. Hence there is a need to consider the farmers'
rights project as a counter regime initiative within a potentially more
unifying and established platform such as the one provided under CBD, 16
especially in regard to the protection of the knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles.
I. International economic and legal backdrop of the TRIPS Agreement
The transition in international intellectual property governance from
the WIPO to the WTO/TRIPS framework is a byproduct of the crisis of
15. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
16. The CBD approach does not, however, present an ultimate solution. Indeed, there is a virtual
consensus that the CBD regime is antithetical to the WTO/TRIPS framework. Since the coming
into force of the two regimes concerted attempts continue to be made to reconcile their conflicted
orientation. Nonetheless, the CBD is an established model which can accommodate, in a uniform
framework, diverse issues such as farmers' rights and other open-ended claims for equity in
international intellectual property lawmaking, especially those coterminous with protection of
indigenous knowledge and innovations.
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confidence between developed and developing countries on the subject
of intellectual property. 7 It also epitomizes the two geopolitical blocs'
conflicted ideological approaches to and expectations for the intellectual
property system. Historically, upon becoming a specialized agency of
the United Nations, WIPO's mandate focused on "promoting creative
intellectual property activity ... for facilitating the transfer of technology
related to industrial property to the developing countries in order to
accelerate economic, social and cultural development." 8 The linkage of
intellectual property to the socio-cultural and economic well-being of
developing countries espouses a vision or ideology of intellectual property
to which WIPO was originally committed. 9
These social and public welfare approaches to intellectual property
rights had little attraction for industrialized countries which were interested
in strategically positioning themselves at a time when revolutions in
digital/information and biotechnologies were transforming the world into
what commentators tagged the knowledge economy.20 Both digital and
biotechnologies marked a shift from a traditional economy. Traced from
the agricultural to industrial revolution, global economic advance has
now entered the information age. Information is the hub of the knowledge
economy. Whilst the agricultural revolution was propelled by land and
labour, and the industrial revolution by mass-produced physical goods and
services, the information revolution of the knowledge economy is driven
by intellectual property2' as the primary mechanism for the allocation of
rights over the products of knowledge. Thus, intellectual property is the
currency of the knowledge economy and the information age.
22
Because of the fluidity of knowledge and information, a tighter or
strengthened regime of boundary fencing through intellectual property
17. See A. Samuel Oddi, "The International Patent System and Third Word Development: Reality
or Myth?" (1987) 1987 Duke L.J. 831; Ruth L. Gana, "Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some
Implications of Internationalization of Intellectual Property" (1995) 24 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 109.
See also Rafik Bawa, "North-South Divide Over the Protection of Intellectual Property" (1997) 6 Dal.
J. Leg. Stud. 77.
18. Art. 1, Agreement between United Nations Organization and the World Intellectual Property
Organization, 17 December 1974, at art. 1, online WIPO <http://www.wip.int/treaties/en/agreement/>.
This is the agreement that brought the WIPO into the UN system and made it one of the UN's
specialized agencies.
19. Since the TRIPS Agreement, the extent of WIPO's commitment is moderated by the provisions
of that Agreement which have whittled down the sphere of economic sovereignty of national
governments.
20. See generally Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5; Braithwaite &Drahos,
Global, supra note 10.
21. George S. Takach, Computer Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) at 48-49 [Takach]
(arguing that the information age does not displace the two previous eras. Rather, it fosters efficient
service delivery in agricultural and industrial activities).
22. Ibid. at xxi. See also Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 1-2.
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regulation became a critical imperative for key players in the knowledge
economy. The dissatisfaction of the developed countries with WIPO's
mandate forebode an ideological schism in the elaboration of a competing
philosophy of intellectual property. Consequently, by deft manoeuvres,
the United States and a few other industrialized countries succeeded in
incorporating intellectual property into the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations.23 Their effort paid off and was elaborated in the 1994
GATT/WTO-TRIPS Agreement. Even though the agreement's ostensible
focus was on trade-centred issues, in truth, TRIPS encapsulated and reified
virtually all aspects of intellectual property, extending private ownership
and proprietary claims to hitherto excluded fields both of the commons
and of diverse human endeavours. The re/location of intellectual property
within the then new WTO framework (GATT's successor regime) brought
it to the centre of traditional debate over the role of social and economic
factors in the international legal constitutive and decision-making
process.
In a 2002 article, 24 Professor James T. Gathii discussed the ambiguous
place of social policy in the international economic and political
institutional frameworks of the post-Second World War era. According to
him, the classical view of international economic institutions, including
the World Bank (the Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and,
by extension, the GATT/WTO in relation to the United Nations, its organs,
and specialized agencies, reflects the conceptual bifurcation of private
and public international law.25 While international economic institutions
narrowly construe their mandate to be mainly economic and financial,
and as having limited, if any, social agenda, the United Nations' role
was acknowledged to be essentially socio-political. 26 This distinction is
reflected in the operational modalities of these institutions. According to
Gathii:
This post-Second World War settlement between public and private
international institutions was not accidental, rather it was the result of
conscious design by architects who wanted to safeguard the international
economy from the whims of politicians. In the view of these architects,
politicians had endangered the international economy in the period
23. The U.S. was spurred on by its powerful transnational pharmaceutical corporations. For the role
and influence of these pharmaceutical lobbies on US intellectual property policies, especially as they
relate to the TRIPS Agreement, see Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5. For
history of the formation of the TRIPS Agreement, see Daniel Gervais, The TRIPSAgreement: Drafting
History and Analysis, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2003).
24. See Gathii, supra note 11 at 295-333; See also James Thuo Gathii, "Re-Characterizing the Social
in the Constitutionalization of the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis" (2001) 7 Widener L. Symp. J. 137.
25. Gathii, supra note 11 at 300.
26. Ibid. at 296.
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following the First World War .... Hence, it was necessary to impose
restrictions on political influence over international economy by placing
power into the hands of technocrats."
Because of the perceived dichotomy in the mandates of the United Nations
and those of the Bretton Woods institutions, historically the latter eschewed
consideration of social or political exigencies in the implementation of
their mandates.28 For instance, the World Bank was barred from interfering
in members' political affairs and forbidden from being "influenced in [its]
decisions by the political character"29 of member states. Consequently,
international economic and financial institutions tended to be narrow in
their focus and to maintain positions that isolated them from the underlying
broader commitments to the socio-political imperatives of international
comity characteristic of public international law.
Inevitably, the conceptual dichotomy between public and private
international law as they corresponded to the mandates of international
economic institutions and the remaining institutions of public international
law was not to endure. For instance, even within public international law,
international legal scholarship has chiselled down the dichotomy in the
hierarchical elaboration and separation of the International Bill of Rights
between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social,
and cultural rights on the other.30 Today, because of the principle of
interrelatedness of rights, it is not off the mark to argue that what is left of
that conceptual dichotomy is rhetorical or at best theoretical.31
27. Ibid.
28. The agreement between the World Bank and the United Nations recognized the Bank as an
independent organization. However, it required the Bank to observe the resolutions of the United
Nations Security Council. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, Nov. 15, 1947, arts. I § 2, VI § 1, 16 U.N.T.S. 346 (1948); Gathii
supra note II at 297 and nn. 129-131 ; see also Samuel A. Bleicher, "UN v. IBRD: A Dilemma of
Functionalism" (1970) 24 International Organization 31, cited in Gathii, supra note 11. Yet, in 1969,
the Bank ignored both General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions for suspension of lending
to Portugal and South Africa for reasons of continued colonial activities in Africa and apartheid
policies respectively.
29. Articles ofAgreement ofthe International Bankfor Reconstruction andDevelopment (establishing
the World Bank) Sec. 27, 1945, art. IV §10, U.N.T.S. 134, 158 "Interdisciplinary Approaches to
International Economic Law"; see also art. III § 5(b); Gathii, supra note II at 296-97 and n. 127;
Nathaniel Berman, "Economic Consequences, Nationalist Passions: Keynes, Crisis, Culture, and
Policy" (1995) 10 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 619.
30. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights In Context: Law, Politics
and Morals, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 268 (arguing that principles of
indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all rights drive the approach to resolve this
dichotomy despite continuing insistence in some quarters that civil and political rights take priority).
31. Ibid.
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The faint border between economic, social, and political subject
matter has continued to peter out in the post-Second World War era.
32
Gradual transformations on the global political landscape from the 1960s
to the 1990s emphasize the relationship between economic and financial
mandates of international economic institutions and social issues, such as
human rights as encapsulated in the United Nations International Bill of
Rights.33 From an historical indifference to social and human rights issues,
the Bank and other international economic institutions have turned full
circle. Since the 1990s, the Bank has, through its good governance policy
"which combines economic and political conditionality,"34 provided an
entry point for the incorporation of the elements of the International Bill
of Rights into its mandate. For instance, environmental accountability and
regard for indigenous ecological vulnerability and other general human
rights concerns are now matters that moderate international economic
policies within and outside the structure of international economic
institutions.35
For Gathii, the reconstruction of the Bank's mandate is hardly evolution
and progress from the classical position, which held that such institutions
were impervious to social issues, to a modern one which is conversely
inclined.36 Rather, "both the World Bank's Articles of Agreement and the
International Bill of Rights provide a sufficiently open-ended interpretive
arena for continued redefinition of the role of the World Bank with respect
to human rights."37 In this open-ended interpretive space which most private
international economic institutions share in their enabling instruments, it
remains extremely difficult to attack their underlying historical ideology on
32. For instance, the evolution of international environmental law from the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) marked the entry of environmental, developmental
and social factors into global economic policy making.
33. Comprising the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Ii), 3(1) U.N. GAOR
Resolutions 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
U.N.TS. 3.
34. Gathii, supra note 11 at 298.
35. Interest in the relationship between environment and development in the early 1970s and its
continued evolution help in part to explain this volte face. See Ibrahim Shihata, "Democracy and
Development" (1997) 46 I.C.L.Q. 635 (on progressive reinterpretation of the World Bank's mandate).
Article XX of GATT, on general exceptions, is the most notable example of the incorporation of social
issue sensitivity into the international economic and trade policy framework. See infra note 39 and
accompanying text.
36. Gathii, supra note 11 at 299.
37. Ibid. See also Laurence R. Helfer, "Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or
Coexistence?" (2003) 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 47 at 57 [Heifer, "Human Rights"] (noting the
elasticity of human rights law); Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization," supra note 12 at 30; Heifer,
"Regime Shifting," supra note 1 at 58.
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the basis of indifference to human rights and other social considerations.38
In part, this explains the ambiguous treatment of the role of social issues
in international economic policy.
The industrialized countries' decision to make intellectual property
a trade issue before the WTO underscores the dominant ideological
consideration behind that initiative. It is obvious from the 1974 agreement
between the WIPO and the United Nations, by which WIPO became
the latter's specialized agency, that the WIPO regime of international
intellectual property fits within the political and social interest nuances
of the public international law of the United Nations. As I have already
noted, Article 1 of the agreement, which is pivotal to that framework, links
intellectual property to technology transfer and to political, economic,
and socio-cultural contingencies in developing countries.39 Perhaps most
importantly, it engrafts and co-opts the WIPO into the public international
legal framework of the United Nations system in harmony with the
mission of the United Nations' other agencies. 40 In the GATT/WTO arena,
intellectual property is incorporated automatically into "the internal logic
of international economic governance."'41 A critical aspect of that internal
logic is driven by the classical ideology of trading regimes in international
38. Ghatii observes that "[t]his possibility of ambiguity in interpreting and reinterpreting the World
Bank's Articles of Agreement and the International Bill of Human Rights simultaneously empowers
and disempowers those involved in this interpretive and strategic work as each side constructs its
case," supra note II at 299. See also Doris Estelle Long, "'Democratizing' Globalization: Practicing
the Policies of Cultural Inclusion" (2002) 10 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 217 at 252, 256 and n. 156
[Long] (arguing that "the more open-ended language in TRIPS ... necessarily allows for a range
of domestic policy choices" that could address social policy concerns); J.H. Reichman, "From Free
Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPS Agreement" (1997) 29 N.Y.U.J. Int'l
L. & Pol. 11 (on the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement that accommodate developing countries'
peculiar needs).
39. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
40. See also supra note 18 at Art. 2.
41. Gathii, supra note II at 295.
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law as self-contained frameworks with little or no obligation to socio-
political and other public interest claims and considerations.
42
A fundamental principle of intellectual property philosophy is the need
to strike a balance between private and public claims to knowledge and
innovation. Commitment to one extreme of the competing tensions distorts
the essence of intellectual property. Because of its root in the internal logic
of international economic governance, that is, in the trade arena, current
intellectual property policy emphasizes one end of the spectrum of the
competing claims, namely, private claims to knowledge as against public
claims and their underlying policy considerations. The dominant pull of
intellectual property policy in the trade arena is the so-called "commodity
logic," which is "based on maximizing profits to producers of IPRs."'43
This vision of intellectual property rights is mainly championed by
Western countries. It stands in conflict with a core objective of intellectual
property in terms of fostering innovation on the one hand. Also, on the
other hand and most important for present purposes, it undermines an
alternative vision of intellectual property, one that supports the role of
intellectual property in promoting public claims to knowledge and other
issues bordering on social justice or public interest.
Similar to the position under international economic institutions
and, by extension, under private international law, the extent to which
the WTO-TRIPS Agreement accommodates social policy for a balanced
vision of intellectual property is at best ambiguous. However, again, as
with the articles of the IMF and other Bretton Woods institutions and their
continuing reconstruction in response to human rights and social policy
issues, TRIPS contains far more open-ended interpretive space in its
text. For instance, its graded transitional provisions, and the provisions
42. Gathii, supra note 11 at 303-304 defines this view as a constitutionalist approach which is
supported by some fairly recent jurisprudence emanating from the GATT, especially in the Thai
Cigarette [Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and External Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT B.I.S.D.
(37th Supp) at 2000 (1991)] and Tuna Dolphin [United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39 Supp) at 155 (1993)] decisions. In both cases the GATT panel took a strictly
limited interpretation of exemptions under Article XX of GATT and failed to realize the objective of
moderating free trade by considerations of public policy. However, in the Shrimp Turtle case (United
States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 38 I.L.M (1999)), the WTO
Appellate Body looked beyond the self-contained character of the intemational trading system. Here,
the VVTO incorporated the principles of international environmental law and its nuanced public policy
undercurrents to arrive at a decision that was not constructionist. According to Gathii, supra note II at
305, the outcome of Shrimp Turtle clearly points to "a different approach that questions the isolation
of the trading regimes from public international law norms such as human rights and environmental
protection." See also Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization," supra note 12 at 32 (alluding to an
analogy between the provisions of Article XX of the GATT and Article 8 of TRIPS).
43. Gathii, supra note II at 312. See also Philip McCalman, "Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical
Analysis of International Patent Harmonization" (2001) 55 Journal of International Economics 161;
Maskus & Reichrnan, "Globalization," supra note 12 at 11; supra note I I and accompanying text.
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on compulsory licence, sui generis form of protection, and ordre public
exemptions" may disempower sustained attack premised on disregard of
human rights and other social policy considerations at the other end of the
intellectual property policy spectrum.
One of the most debated issues is whether the TRIPS Agreement
struck a satisfactory balance between the commodity logic of intellectual
property and social policy claims. The symbolic import of the transfer of
intellectual property policy-making to the international economic and trade
arena is that it signals the triumph of the commodity logic of intellectual
property. In the trade arena, the social policy considerations inherent in
intellectual property are, at best, subservient to the commodity logic. 45 In
the next section, I highlight a few aspects of the trade-driven revolution
in intellectual property jurisprudence under the TRIPS Agreement that
underscore the bias of the TRIPS regime in favour of the commodity
logic.
1. Commodity logic and the TRIPS revolution
Literature on the changes introduced into the international intellectual
property regime under the TRIPS Agreement vis-d-vis the pre-TRIPS
WIPO framework is not lacking.4 6 A detailed discussion of those changes
would be diversionary at this point. A more useful pursuit is to sketch, in
an admittedly simplified way, key aspects of those changes that undermine
the ability of developing countries to use intellectual property to address
social policy imperatives in the exercise of their economic sovereignty
guaranteed under the pre-TRIPS era.
The first most significant change is that the TRIPS Agreement created
an international intellectual property regime with binding, albeit minimum,
substantive content. Under TRIPS, no longer are states' obligations to
protect intellectual property optional; no longer is there ambivalence
regarding the substantive content of the international intellectual property
regime, or the extent of states' commitment to them. Second, accession
to the TRIPS Agreement is automatic and compulsory for all members
44. See TRIPS, supra note 3 at Arts. 8, 27, 31; see also preamble to TRIPS ("Recognizing the
underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property,
including developmental and technological objectives"). See Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization,"
supra note 12 at 32.
45. According to Long, supra note 38 at 252, "because harmonization of intellectual property rights
[under TRIPS] is focused on enhancing the trade nature of intellectual property rights, social justice
and public welfare issues, including right of access by marginalized sectors of society (at both a
national and international level) are minimized, if not completely ignored." Consider, for example, the
TRIPS preamble which refers to intellectual property fights as private rights, see supra note 3. See also
Heifer, "Human Rights," supra note 37 at 58.
46. See e.g. J.H. Reichman, "Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement" (1995) 29 International Lawyer 345.
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of the WTO. Third, quite unlike the immediately preceding arrangement,
TRIPS incorporates WTO's "hard-edged" binding dispute settlement and
enforcement system.47 This system permits retaliatory trade sanctions
against erring states. Fourth - perhaps the farthest reaching - is the
expansion of the scope of intellectual property to a number of areas,
48
notably genetic resources, pharmaceuticals and plant varieties. In the
previous regime, deference to cultural and moral considerations accounted
for the exclusion of these areas from private ownership.
49
TRIPS' expansion of the scope of patentable subject matter to these
key areas implicates the influence on the agreement of American patent
jurisprudence." Through a 1980 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
endorsed an extremely expansive interpretation of section 101 of the U.S.
Patent Act on patentable subject matter." The Court held that under U.S.
patent jurisprudence "anything under the sun that is made by man" was
subject to patent protection. 2 Consistent with this thinking, the TRIPS
Agreement sanctions patent protection in almost all areas of commerce,
notably pharmaceuticals, genetic resources and plant varieties.
On social policy grounds, especially in regard to public health,
developing countries were less inclined to grant patents on pharmaceuticals.
Similarly, for cultural and economic reasons, developing countries did not
encourage private ownership of genetic resources, including agricultural
and plant varieties. To further entrench its underlying commodity logic,
TRIPS places stricter restrictions on the ability of states to take advantage
of compulsory licence schemes over patented inventions. 3 Compulsory
licences were previously employed by developing countries to address
price distortions and to tackle local supply gaps for essential products,
especially pharmaceuticals and agro/industrial chemicals.
47. Helfer, "Human Rights," supra note 37 at 54. See also J.H. Reichman, "The TRIPS Agreement
Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with Developing Countries?" (2000) 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l
L. 441 at 443-47 [Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation"].
48. Aside from these areas TRIPS extended intellectual property to computer programs as literary
works, as opposed to their status as patentable inventions under the Berne Convention. TRIPS mandates
the creation of "rental rights" to enable authors of computer programs and producers and performers of
sound recordings to control commercial rental of their work to the public, and acts of bootlegging as
part of the anti-piracy strategy. See Cheek, supra note I at 293; see also art. 10 of TRIPS, supra note
3; Adrian Otten and Hannu Wager, "Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View" (1996) 29
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 391 at 396.
49. See Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 27.
50. As "the world's biggest net intellectual property exporter" the TRIPS Agreement benefited the
United States more than the European Community: see Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization," supra
note 12at 11.
51. See Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
52. Ibid. at 309 (alluding to a Senate Committee report).
53. TRIPS, supra note 3 at Art. 31 (permitting compulsory licences in cases of national health
emergency subject to stringent conditions that privilege foreign patent holders).
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The creation of a binding, albeit minimum, substantive and enforceable
international intellectual property regime, as well as the extension of
intellectual property, especially patent protection, to genetic resources,
pharmaceutical and plant varieties are key highlights of the TRIPS
regime. In their detailed enunciation, these changes represent "a marked
strengthening of substantive intellectual property standards" in a direction
opposed to the social interest sensitivities of developing countries and
their economic sovereignty guaranteed under the pre-TRIPS framework. 4
Consequently, the entrance of the TRIPS Agreement into the global
intellectual property equation has yielded a culture of disaffection against
the Agreement by developing countries akin to the one that prevailed
against the WIPO framework by their developed counterparts. 5
More than any of the changes introduced by the TRIPS Agreement,
patent protection for pharmaceuticals, gene patents or patentability of life
forms, including plant varieties, represent the sparkplugs that have fired
the opposition and resistance. The reason for this is not far-fetched. These
subjects are pivots around which "issue densities" of and "issue linkages" to
intellectual property are elaborated in the post-TRIPS era. 6 Mildly stated,
these linkages underscore the outright weakness or oversight of the TRIPS
Agreement. They provide the platform for exploiting TRIPS' social policy
deficit and its underlying inequities. Also, they constitute the catalysts for
countertrends or dedicated opposition to the TRIPS Agreement and its
commodity logic. Before broaching the counter regime trends in Part III,
the next part identifies other factors complicit in sustained resistance to the
TRIPS Agreement which, invariably, fuel the counter regime movement in
intellectual property regulation post-TRIPS.
II. Build-up to counter regime trends
1. TRIPS under pressure
A combination of circumstances, both in the formation of the TRIPS
Agreement and after it came into force, conspires to put the agreement
under pressure, even as those circumstances foster counter-trends in
international intellectual property lawmaking. For instance, according to
54. See Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 18.
55. See Paul Salmon, "Cooperation Between the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
and the Word Trade Organization (WTO)" (2003) 17 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 429 at 433
[Salmon]; Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 20; Cheek, supra note 1 at 287. See generally
Monique L. Corday, "GATT v. WIPO" (1994) 16 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society
121.
56. See Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 8 citing Robert 0. Keohane, "The Demand for
International Regimes" in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983) 141 at 155. According to Heifer, Keohane defines "issue density" as "the number of
issues within a given policy space".
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Drahos and Braithwaite, the TRIPS Agreement was secured by the United
States and the rest of the industrialized countries through a strategy of
coercion. 7 By means of "special 301," threats of sanction and other arm-
twisting strategies, the United States secured specific bilateral intellectual
property agreements with a number of developing countries prior to
entering TRIPS negotiations.58 Armed with those bilateral agreements, the
United States used the TRIPS negotiations as a multilateral platform to
rein in the remaining countries.59 The putative consensus that later became
the TRIPS Agreement was secured, for the most part, by coercion. Thus,
the liability arising from TRIPS' democratic deficit continues to haunt the
agreement.
The negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement was characterized by
what has been termed "bargain linkage diplomacy."60 By this technique,
developing countries were lured into committing to a stronger and
more burdensome intellectual property regime in exchange for greater
access to agricultural, textile and other export opportunities in foreign
markets, including reductions in agricultural subsidies and concessions
on imports of tropical products. 61 According to Helfer, "[a]s the region
and the nation with the largest domestic markets, the EC and the United
States have the most power to shape trade bargains according to their
interests by promising to open (or threatening to close) their markets to
foreign goods. ' 62 A rather subtle and often unmentioned aspect of bargain
diplomacy relates to the irritating use of unilateral trade sanctions and
other bilateral pressures by the United States. Many countries, developing
and developed,63 acquiesced in making intellectual property a trade issue
57. See Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 12 (noting that "the intellectual
property rights regime we have today largely represents the failure of democratic processes, both
nationally and internationally. A small number of U.S. companies, which were established players in
the knowledge game, captured the U.S. trade-agenda setting process and then, in partnership with the
European and Japanese multinationals drafted the intellectual property principles that became the blue
print for TRIPS"). See also ibid. at 85-99, 191; Cheek, supra note I at 283.
58. "Special 301" is one of the statutory vehicles for U.S. unilateral trade sanction under the Trade
Act of 1974 as amended by 1988 and 1994 Acts. The others are section 301, and 'super 301'. See
Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note 1 at 22, n. 91; Cheek, supra note I at 301. See also Drahos &
Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 191.
59. See Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, ibid. (arguing that the U.S. went into the
TRIPS negotiation "with a sequence of strategic bilaterals already having made certain terms of the
favored multilateral deal a fait accompli"). See also Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 20-21.
See generally Braithwaite & Drahos, Global, supra note 10.
60. See Long, supra note 38 at 242.
61. For detailed discussion of other concessions, see Frederick Abbott, "Protecting First World Assets
in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework" (1989) 22
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 689.
62. See Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 21.
63. Industrialized countries and other U.S. allies are not exempt from the special 301 process and
threats of sanction; Japan is a notable example, see Cheek, supra note I at 303.
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in exchange for the United State's scaling down of its excessive use of
unilateral trade sanctions and other acts of coerced bilateralism.6
More than a decade after the TRIPS Agreement, the prevailing
impression is that, in relation to developing countries, it has left in its wake
"a sobering list of negative factors. '65 Key promoters of TRIPS, especially
the United States and the European Union, have neither delivered nor
shown a commitment to deliver on the promise of bargain diplomacy on the
two major fronts: trade concessions and market access, and scaling down
the use of unilateral/bilateral mechanisms. 66 Long notes that "[n]umerous
scholars have criticized TRIPS for being a bad bargain obtained, as a
result of coercive power, for which the agreed-upon concessions have not
been achieved. '67 Similarly, Reichman decries the cold treatment of the
issue of new trade concessions for developing countries. He hints at the
possibility of introducing trade concessions into debt forgiveness deals
"as a trump card in any future round of multilateral trade negotiations. 68
It remains to be seen whether the 2005 debt forgiveness package for the
world's eighteen poorest countries by the Paris Club of creditor nations
(the G8) will result in the latter adopting a hardened stance on future trade
negotiations at the WTO.
69
Contrary to the so-called promise of TRIPS' bargain diplomacy, the
United States and the European Union continue to step up domestic farming
subsidies.7° This practice has resulted in developing countries becoming
dumping grounds for foreign agricultural products. Another noted result
64. See G. Richard Shell, "Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization" (1995) 44 Duke L. J. 829 at 843-44; see also Heifer, "Regime Shifting,"
supra note I at 22.
65. Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation," supra note 47 at 456 (discussing a litany of hardships
TRIPS has wrought on developing countries).
66. See Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 11.
67. See Long, supra note 33 at 256.
68. See Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation," supra note 47 at 456.
69. The sweeping debt forgiveness package was announced by the G8 at a meeting in London on
June, 11 2005. Under the resulting agreement, eighteen countries - Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger,
Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia - will receive immediate forgiveness for the more
than $40 billion they owe to the World Bank, African Development Bank and the International
Monetary Fund.
70. See Stop the Dumping: How EU Agricultural Subsidies are Damaging Livelihoods in the
Developing World (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 31, 2002), online: Oxfam <www.oxfam.org.uk/what_
we do/issues/trade/bp31 dumping.htm>. See also Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism,
supra note 5 at 11. See generally "Agricultural Subsidies," online: Global Policy Forum <http://www.
globalpolicy.org/socecon/trade/subsidies>. The agricultural subsidy question remains one of the
knottiest issues that stall progress in international trade negotiations at the WTO. For instance, the
failed July 2006 trade negotiations by the Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) of the so-called G6
(US, the EU, Japan, Australia, India and Brazil) which led to indefinite suspension of all TNC talks at
the WTO was as a result of buck passing between the US and EU over their inflexibility on the subject
of farm subsidies.
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of this practice is the stifling of the competitiveness and export potential
of the developing world's agricultural and other sectors. At the same
time, the industrialized countries, especially the United States, continue
to champion new agricultural biotechnologies that have the potential to
inflict negative impacts on developing countries.7 An example is genetic
use restriction or the so-called terminator technologies and other genetic
modification practices that further erode the benefit, if any, of the TRIPS'
bargain for developing countries.72
Similarly, in a strategic fashion, developed countries have exploited the
minimalist nature of TRIPS' provisions to negotiate stronger intellectual
property protection under the so-called TRIPS-plus agreements.73
Essentially, these agreements are bilateral in nature.74 Thus, for the
United States, the expectation that the TRIPS Agreement will result in a
restrained wielding of its unilateral and bilateral trade powers through the
powerful office of United States Trade Representative (USTR)75 has yet
to prove true.76 Indeed, in 1994, just before TRIPS came into force, the
U.S. Congress amended the "special 301" provisions of the Trade Act to
affirm that a country's compliance with the TRIPS Agreement does not
necessarily satisfy the requirement of adequate and effective intellectual
71. Dahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 11.
72. See Chidi Oguamanam, "Genetic Use Restriction (or Terminator) Technologies (GURTs) in
Agricultural Biotechnologies: The Limits ofTechnological Alternatives to Intellectual Property" (2005)
4 C.J.L.T. 59 at 64-68 (discussing United States' support for terminator technologies at the expert
debate on potential impact of the commercialization of terminator technology under the Convention
on Biological Diversity) [Oguamanam, "Terminator"]. Terminator technology is a new biotechnology
or genetic engineering device for the suppression of true-to-type second generation seeds or genetic
copy propagation. It is designed, inter alia, to secure seed monopoly for seed companies so that
farmers will depend on them for seed supply. Although the technologies have yet to be approved for
commercial exploitation, terminator patents have continued to be granted in industrialized countries.
73. New demands for higher intellectual property protection by the United States, the European
Union and Japan are the strategic bases for the Millennium Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
See Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation," supra note 47 at 454. See also Heifer, "Human Rights,"
supra note 37 at 59; Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization," supra note 12 at 5; Peter Drahos,
"Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard Setting" (2002) 5 Journal of
World Intellectual Property 765. See generally infra note 80 and accompanying text.
74. For an outline of U.S. and EC TRIPS-plus treaties, see Peter Drahos, "BITs and BIPs" (2000) 4
World Intellectual Property Law 791 at 792-807; .'TRIPs-plus' Through the Back Door: How Bilateral
Treaties Impose Much Stronger Rules for IPRs on Life than WTO", online: Genetic Resources Action
International Law (GRAIN), <http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=6>. See also Regionalism and the
Multilateral Trading System 11-22 (July 21, 2003), online: Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), <http//wwwl.oecd.org/publications/e-book/2203031E.pdf>; Cheek,
supra note 1 at 4 and n. 10.
75. The U.S.T.R. has statutory power to unilaterally impose sanctions on countries with policies
considered hostile to U.S. intellectual property interests.
76. See Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation," supra note 47 at 454, noting that "the United States
continues to threaten the rest of the world with Section 301 actions, even though the DSU [Dispute
Settlement Understanding of GATT/WTO] in Article 23, appears to outlaw resort to unilateral actions
as part of the package deal underlying the Uruguay Round."
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property protection.77 In 2003-2004 alone, the United States entered
into bilateral agreements containing TRIPS-plus provisions with more
than fourteen mainly developing countries" who have substantial export
dependency on the American market. That list continues to grow.
On the multilateral front, through a series of free trade, investment,
trade partnership, and WTO accession agreements, the United States and
other industrialized countries have induced many more countries to accept
a 'TRIPS-plus' intellectual property protection standard.79 According to
Morin, post-TRIPS bilateral and multilateral treaties have been exploited
by developed countries to achieve their exit from unwanted TRIPS
obligations and to secure the entry of developing countries into a TRIPS-
plus regime of intellectual property protection.8" For example, many of
these special agreements require developing countries to ratify the 1991
UPOV Convention, which sets higher standards of protection for plant
genetic resources than those countries' obligations under TRIPS.
In addition to the apparent failure to realize the promise of bargain
diplomacy and the free rein of TRIPS-plus agreements, developed
countries have held onto a strict or maximalist interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement in what has been termed a "pound of flesh mentality. 8 2 This
includes their determination to extend intellectual property protection to
77. See Cheek, supra note 1 at 301.
78. See Jean-Frederic Morin, "Bilateral IP Treaties," paper presented at the Annual Congress of the
Association for Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Montreal,
July 12, 2005 (on file with the author). The countries include Jamaica, Lithuania, Latvia, Trinidad
and Tobago, Cambodia, Peru, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Jordan, Singapore, Chile, Australia, Morocco, and
Bahrain.
79. Cheek, supra note 1 at 303, reports that by the end of 1999 the U.S. had signed forty-two bilateral
investment treaties (containing annexed provisions on intellectual property issues) with developing
countries, East European and former Soviet republics.
80. See Morin, supra note 78. For instance, the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement requires
Morocco to ratify the UPOV Convention of 1991 (see infra note 81) and to extend patent protection
to plants and animals, and by so doing, undermines Morocco's right not to grant animal patents under
TRIPS. By indirect pressure on countries to ratify the UPOV Convention through bilateral and free
trade deals, developed countries, especially the U.S., succeed in imposing the TRIPS-plus standards
on developing countries. Consequently, despite its historical association with developed countries as
front role players in plant breeding, through the subtleties of multilateral and bilateral agreements,
since 1991, the number of developing country ratifications of the UPOV Convention has shot up.
At last count, over thirty of them are members of the UPOV Convention, as opposed to a little over
twenty members from the industrialized world.
81. International Convention for the Protection of New Varities of Plants, 2 December 1961, 815
U.N.T.S. 89, (revised at Geneva on 10 November 1972, on 23 October 1978, and on 19 March 1991)
online: <http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/index.html>. Popularly known by its
abbreviation, UPOV stands (in French) for Union pour la protection des Obstentions Vegetales. The
original UPOV, signed December 2, 1961, was revised in Geneva on Nov. 10, 1072, on Oct. 23, 1978,
and on Mar. 19, 1991. See generally infra note 121.
82. See Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation," supra note 47 at 452.
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issues over which there was previously no consensus.83 Provocatively, the
industrialized countries have attempted to foreclose developing countries'
legitimate bid to take advantage of the wiggle room in the TRIPS
Agreement to tackle social justice and public interest issues such as access
to essential medicines and other public health exigencies. This issue came
to a head in the celebrated row between the United States and South Africa
over the latter's attempt to use TRIPS' compulsory licence provisions to
override patent restrictions in order to procure drugs needed to stem the
tide of the AIDS pandemic. Recapitulating this well-discussed subject is
not necessary here, save to mention that the episode was symbolic and
affirmative of the popular thinking that in the trade arena intellectual
property is insensitive to social welfare considerations.
84
The South African episode was a wake-up call, one that drove home
the "growing belief, shared by many developing countries, NGOs,
and commentators, that TRIPS was a coerced agreement that should
be resisted rather than embraced." 5 In fact, dedicated resistance to the
TRIPS Agreement predates the South Africa-United States AIDS drug
imbroglio. That resistance is rooted in the inherent weakness of the TRIPS
Agreement, fostered by post-TRIPS trends and aspects of the globalization
phenomenon. This set of interrelated factors is elaborated through the issue
linkage strategy that extends intellectual property beyond TRIPS' narrow
framework. The next section tackles the complicity of globalization in the
extant tension in the intellectual property regime.
83. Ibid. at 453 and n. 62.
84. For examples of just how well-discussed this subject is see Gathii, supra note 11; Winston P.
Nagan, "International Intellectual Property, Access to Health Care, and Human Rights: South Africa
v. United States" (2002) 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 155; Oxfam Background Briefing, "South Africa vs. the
Drug Giants: A Challenge to Affordable Medicines" online: Oxfam, <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_
we do/issues/health/drugcomp sa.htm>; Susan K. Sell, "Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension
Between Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property" (2002) 14 Fla. J.
Int'l L. 193 [Sell, "Tension"]; Thomas K. Mirabile, "Aids, Africa, and Access to Medicines" (2002) 11
MSU-DCL J. Int'l L. 175; Christopher K. Eppich, "Patenting Dilemma: Drugs for Profit Versus Drugs
for Health" (2002) 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 289; Dahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra
note 5 at 5-10. See generally Simon Portman, "Arrested Development: Patents and Affordability for
Poorer Countries" (2003) 154 Patent World 15; Danny Huntington, "Redressing the Wrongs: Patent
System not the Venue to Address Indigenous Rights" (2003) 154 Patent World 22.
85. Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 24.
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2. Fuelling regime tension in intellectual property: the complicity of
globalization
Theorists of globalization admit that the phenomenon poses definitional
as well as interpretational quandaries. 86 However, despite its diverse
paradigms,87 conventional narrative posits that globalization involves
at least a triple process of economic, socio-cultural and political
transnationalization and regulatory harmonization.88 As a trend, global-
ization dates in time to civilization's earliest attempts to explore the
potentials of regulatory harmonization across conventional barriers.
Nonetheless, contemporary consciousness about globalization is
conveniently located in post-Cold War structural changes in the
transnational system within the framework of advancing capitalist and free
market ideals.89 As aspects of its character, globalization "facilitates [and]
is facilitated by a centralized regulatory scheme in a number of spheres,
including economic, social, human, natural, and material resources."9
Developments since the last half of the twentieth century, including but
not limited to exponential advancement in technologies, especially digital
and biotechnologies, consolidate and are consolidated by the globalization
phenomenon. The multiplier effect of these paradigmatic technologies
is evident in electronic commerce, the intemet, service delivery, health
care, cultural empowerment, education, immigration, agriculture, and
research. All of these are sites of intellectual investments that continue to
stretch the possibilities that unlock the gate into our knowledge economy.
As the currency of the knowledge economy, intellectual property plays a
86. Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Toward A New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics In The
Paradigmatic Transition (New York: Routledge, 1995) at 260; Long, supra note 38 at 227 and n. 28
[De Sousa Santos] (alluding to the complex and multifaceted nature of the globalization analysis). See
also Angela R. Riley, "Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An Essay on Rights and
Responsibilities" (2004) 14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 155 at 156 [Riley].
87. See Leslie K. Skair, "Competing Conceptions of Globalization" (1999) Journal of World
Systems-Research 143. This article is not concerned with and does not engage in an elaborate detour
on globalization save to exploit aspects of the globalization discourse that assist the paper's conceptual
logic and overall thesis, especially in regard to how globalization is implicated in regime shift and
in the counter regime trends that sustain the extant tension in international intellectual property
jurisprudence.
88. See Chidi Oguamanam, "Localizing Intellectual Property in the Globalization Epoch: The
Integration of Indigenous Knowledge" (2004) 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 135 at 164 [Oguamanam,
"Localizing"]; see also Riley, supra note 86 at 156; Long, supra note 38 at 226-27.
89. See Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of Post Cold War (New York:
Random House, 2000).
90. Oguamanam, "Localizing," supra note 88 at 164.
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significant role for stakeholders. 9' It secures the boundaries of valuable
knowledge and creates artificial scarcity around that knowledge in order
to shore up its value and marketability.
Extending globalization through a harmonized intellectual property
regime has been inevitable. An effective global intellectual property
framework has been an attractive option for taking advantage of the fluidity
of knowledge and its rapid diffusion in the new economy as fostered,
particularly, by digital and biotechnologies in the emergent information
society.92 Thus, as I have observed elsewhere, the TRIPS Agreement is an
"IP handmaiden [deliberately] groomed for the service of globalization
and internationalization of markets" in the knowledge economy.93
One casualty of globalization illustrated by the TRIPS Agreement
is the reduction in the sphere of influence of national governments and
their ability to exercise economic sovereignty.94 The international arena,
dominated by stronger states and their allies, has become the preferred
site for promoting a rule-based global trading system of which the
WTO-TRIPS Agreement is a strategic component.95 Expectedly, in the
vision of the United States and its European Union and Japanese allies, a
globally harmonized regulatory framework for intellectual property has
been strategic in securing their high intellectual stakes in digital and bio-
technologies. Both technologies are symbiotically tied to the globalization
phenomenon as they propel and are propelled by it.96
However, the above perspective on globalization, which emphasizes
its complicity in advancing a harmonized rule-based global trading system,
undermines what has been described as the phenomenon's interpretive
dilemma, a point that was equally ignored by the TRIPS Agreement's
narrow focus on trade. Beyond the uniformization or harmonization
hypothesis,97 globalization breeds a counter or antithetical culture of
91. Literature associating globalization with intellectual property does so from more than one
perspective. For instance, while Long, supra note 38 at 227, describes regulatory harmonization in
intellectual property as a counterpart to broader globalization, others see such harmonization as a
component or aspect of the globalization phenomenon. See Oguamanan, "Localizing," supra note 88.
See generally Cheek, supra note 1; Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of
Intellectual Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) [Sell, Private Power];
Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization," supra note 12.
92. See generally Takach, supra note 21.
93. Oguamanam, "Localizing," supra note 88 at 164.
94. See Long, supra note 38 at 231-233.
95. See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997) 1-30 (on the rule-based global trading
system), cited in Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation," supra note 47 at 446 and n. 24.
96. According to Long, supra note 38 at 259, "[t]he spread and breath of economic globalization
seems matched by the speed and breath of current IPR harmonization efforts."
97. See De Sousa Santos, supra note 86 at 253.
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resistance to the hegemonic nuances inherent in its mission of regulatory
harmonization. Thus, globalization's harmonizing mission "contributes
to a sense of isolation and alienation which generates its own backlash
against [its] integratory demands."98
Through TRIPS, diverse non-Western peoples and cultures have
been coerced, via the agency of their national governments, into the
conventional Western ideology of intellectual property in its narrow
trade-based context in the name of regulatory harmonization. However,
since the TRIPS Agreement, a counter regime trend has begun to brew,
both in an attempt to resist TRIPS and its underlying ideology, as well as
to expand its interpretive space in order to accommodate crucial social
policy and cultural sensitivities in developing countries. This dual culture
of resistance to and pressure for a reinterpretation of TRIPS is essentially
pursued through the strategy of issue linkage that ventilates from at least
four substantive areas or counter regime domains of the Agreement in a
fashion symptomatic of the backlash of the globalization phenomenon.
The next part explores those substantive domains.
III. Domains of resistance and counter regime trends post-TRIPS
In a seminal article, Professor Laurence Heifer identified what he
characterized as four international regimes for new intellectual property
lawmaking.99 They are biodiversity, plant genetic resources (PGRs) for
food and agriculture, public health, and human rights.100 While intellectual
property rights are relevant to the issue density implicated in these areas,
Helfer noted that "prior to the negotiation of TRIPs they had received
only limited attention in the biodiversity and PGRs regimes and virtually
no attention in the public health and human rights regimes."'' TRIPS's
98. See Long, supra note 38 at 234 and n. 56.
99. See Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 27. Compare Okediji, "Developing Country
Participation," supra note I at 317-18 identifying what she calls "four major narratives" that "provide
countervailing norms" for developing countries to challenge the current international intellectual
property protection regime.
100. Other discourses on new arenas for intellectual property lawmaking identify indigenous knowledge
protection which is associated with biodiversity conservation under the framework Convention on
Biological Diversity, supra note 13. See, e.g., Calestous Juma, "Intellectual Property Rights and
Globalization: Implications for Developing Countries" online: Centre for International Development
at Harvard University <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidbrotech/dp>, (identifying emerging issues
that underscore the implication of TRIPS for development in the third world and, by extension, the
basis for anti-TRIPS sentiments to include pressures arising from national implementation of the
agreement, issues of technological development, plant variety protection, geographical indications
and biodiversity and related traditional knowledge). See also Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization,"
supra note 12 at 29. See generally Reichman, "Conflict or Cooperation," supra note 47; Charles
R. McManis, "Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge Protection:
Thinking Globally, Acting Locally" (2003) 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 547 [McManis, "Thinking
Globally"].
101. See Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 27.
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audacity in extending intellectual property protection to subject matters
of critical interest to developing countries and indigenous and local
communities - namely genetic resources, pharmaceuticals and plant
varieties - is catalytic to the emergence of a dedicated opposition to the
TRIPS regime. Capturing this point, again Helfer wrote:
In the wake of TRIPS ... developing countries, aided by NGOs and (less
frequently) by officials of intergovernmental organizations, have adopted
a strategy of regime shifting to move intellectual property lawmaking into
fora where it was only nascent and to raise intellectual property issues for
the first time in other venues. This strategy has resulted in the drafting of
new treaties, the reinterpretation of existing agreements, and creation of
new nonbinding declarations, guidelines, and recommendations. Many
of these developments criticize the TRIPs Agreement (both for what
it includes and what it excludes) as well as other intellectual property
protection standards. 2
One of the reasons for increased visibility and activism of various NGOs,
intergovernmental bodies and other interest groups is their enhanced ability
to forge strategic alliances across borders. 103 Their access to enabling
digital/information technologies and their effective coordination of
dynamic coalitions that now "form the core of a new and vibrant political
movement organized around growing [and sometimes institutional]
opposition to existing intellectual property [law]" is made possible for
the most part by globalization.' ° Unprecedented opening in transnational
mobilization and solidarity of hitherto uncoordinated interest groups is
one of the benefits of globalization.105
1. Biodiversity and indigenous knowledge
As noted above, the association of intellectual property with biodiversity
related knowledge received limited attention prior to TRIPS. However, the
emergence of TRIPS and its deliberate omission of indigenous knowledge
(as a general matter) under controversial Article 27 provided an entry point
102. See Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note 1 at 27-8.
103. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Chidi Oguamanam, "Protecting Indigenous
Knowledge in International Law: Solidarity Beyond Nation-States" in Catherine Dauvergne and W.
Wesley Pue, eds. Law Text Culture Vol. 8 "Challenging Nation" (Wollongong: Southwood Press,
2004) 191-230 [Oguamanam, "Protecting Indigenous Knowledge"]. Cf Drahos & Braithwaite,
Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 17 (lamenting that organizations fighting for preservation of
intellectual commons do so in isolation of one another without necessary coordination and alliances).
104. See Rosemary J. Coombe, "The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Traditional
Knowledge in International Law" (2001) 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 275 at 278 [Coombe, "Indigenous
Peoples"].
105. See Oguamanam, "Localizing," supra note 88 at 152. See also De Sousa Santos, supra note 86
at 264; Mike Featherstone, ed., Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity (London:
Sage, 1990).
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for a counter regime trend. Specifically, the introduction of biodiversity and
indigenous knowledge as a new arena of intellectual property discourse
was made possible partly as result of TRIPS' omission of these subjects.
Since coming into force over a decade ago, the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)0 6 has dedicatedly pursued its objective of ensuring
biological diversity conservation, sustainable use of biological diversity
components and fair and equitable sharing of their benefits.0 7 Because of
the abundance of bioresources in developing countries and the centrality
of an ecology imperative in knowledge generation in indigenous circles," 8
CBD recognizes the role of indigenous knowledge in its mission and the
relevance of intellectual property to access and benefit sharing of genetic
resources and technology transfer.'0 9
Although CBD is not a treaty dedicated to indigenous peoples/
knowledge, it is today the most authoritative juridical framework and
platform for the protection of that knowledge." 0 Through the activities
of its governing body, the Conference of Parties, CBD is involved in
a variety of initiatives in association with WIPO and various other
specialized agencies of the United Nations in championing the protection
of indigenous knowledge."' Because of its accommodation of NGOs and
diverse interest groups in its policy-making deliberations, indigenous and
environmental NGOs have capitalized on the goodwill of CBD to elaborate
an alternative vision of intellectual property. Pursuant to Article 8(j) of the
Convention, the CBD Secretariat has exploited the framework nature of
the treaty to encourage and supervise national and regional legislation,
intergovernmental instruments and other soft law initiatives that support
106. See supra note 13.
107. Ibid. at Art 1.
108. See Darrell Addison Posey, ed., Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biological Diversity (Nairobi/
London: Intermediate Technology Publications/UNEP, 1999). See also Marie Battiste & James Y.
Henderson, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage: A Global Challenge (Saskatoon: Purich,
2000).
109. See supra note 13 at Arts. 8(j), 10(c), 16(5). See also Chidi Oguamanam, "The Convention
on Biological Diversity and Intellectual Property Rights: The Challenge of Indigenous Knowledge"
(2003) 7 Southern Cross University Law Review 89 at 102.
110. See Chidi Oguamanam, International Law and Indigenous Knowledge: Intellectual Property,
Plant Biodiversity and Traditional Medicine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 5.
111. See Oguamanam, "Localizing," supra note 88 at 158-162 (detailing WIPO/CBD initiatives and
collaborations on the protection of indigenous knowledge). See also Coombe, "Indigenous Peoples,"
supra note 104 at 284; McManis, "Thinking Globally," supra note 100 at 556-7.
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the link between intellectual property and local knowledge protection."2
Because of the perception of conflict between the objectives of CBD and
TRIPS' intellectual property framework, the relationship between the
two treaties and the need for their reconciliation has not only generated
a significant amount of literature, but is now a subject for future trade
negotiations, including a review of the TRIPS Agreement." 3 The short
point here is that despite the disdain in which the TRIPS Agreement held
indigenous (biodiversity-related) knowledge, its omission from TRIPS has
been exploited by developing countries, who have made it an important
part of an emerging counter regime.
2. Public health and human rights
TRIPS' reforms, particularly in regard to empowering patent owners,
curtailing the use of compulsory licences and generally in extending
mandatory intellectual property protection to pharmaceuticals in
developing countries - an issue that was optional under the pre-TRIPS
WIPO framework - provided the entry point for linking intellectual
property to public health and, to some extent, human rights. Admittedly, the
public health crises arising from the TRIPS-inspired rigid pharmaceutical
patent regime demonstrate the Agreement's complicity in undermining
human rights. At the same time, the anti-human rights ramifications of
international economic and trade policies, especially in the context of the
GATT/WTO framework of which TRIPS is a component, encompass public
health issues. 4 In general, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable local
112. Since the mid-1990s, many countries have enacted national laws, and several regional groups
have drafted model legislation on biodiversity, access and benefit sharing, indigenous and related
knowledge. These laws entrench the role of intellectual property in the context of generation, use and
transmission of local knowledge. See "Biodiversity Rights Legislation (BRL)", online: GRAIN <http://
www.grain.org/brl/>. See also Keny ten Kate & Sarah A. Laird, Commercial Use of Biodiversity:
Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-Sharing (London: Erathscan, 1999) at 4.
113. See, e.g., Heifer, "Human Rights," supra note 37 at 60 (stating that the 2001 Doha Ministerial
declaration mandated the TRIPS Council to evaluate "the relationship between [TRIPS] and the
Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other
relevant new developments raised by Members.") See also WTO, Doha Ministerial Conference,
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreements and Public Health, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)DEC/2(2001),
41h Sess.; Charles R. McManis, "The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Environmental
Protection: Biodiversity and Biotechnology" (1998) 76 Wash. U.L.Q. 255; David R. Downes, "How
Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge" (2000) 25 Colum. J. Envtl.
L. 253. See The Relationship Between the CBD and the Commission on Sustainable Development
and Biodiversity-Related Conventions, Other International Agreements and Institutions of Relevance,
Conf. of Parties Decision IV/15, online: CBD <http:www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?m=COP-
04&id=7138>. See also CBD, Conf. of Parties Decision IV/9, para. 16 and V/16 para. 14.
114. The protection of indigenous knowledge provides the principal platform on which the intersection
of intellectual property and human rights is being explored in the post-TRIPS era. See Heifer, "Human
Rights, supra note 37 at 52; Erica-Irene Daes, "Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples" (2001)
95 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting - American Society of International Law 143. See also infra
note 172.
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communities link their cultural survival, spiritual autonomy and identity
(as aspects of their quest for self-determination) with the protection of their
knowledge." 5 The general perception that TRIPS promotes the Western
ideology of intellectual property at the expense of alternative epistemic
worldviews raises, in indigenous circles, fundamental human rights issues
beyond those inherent in the public health crises. Thus, TRIPS' human
rights deficit is obvious from the public health catharsis it has engendered,
particularly regarding access to essential drugs. Yet that is only an aspect
(admittedly a sensitive one) of a bigger puzzle.
Despite the reluctance of the United States and the rest of the
industrialized world to embrace the link between intellectual property
and human rights," 6 that nexus constitutes, in the post-TRIPS period,
a source of fast-growing jurisprudence and scholarship on intellectual
property lawmaking." 7 Human rights are but one of the several heads
of issues jostling under the umbrella of the counter regime trend and the
resistance to the narrow commodity logic and trade ideology of the TRIPS
Agreement. In vindication of Gathii's theory of an open-ended interpretive
space existing in international economic instruments, the entrenchment
of public health and human rights issues as part of a compelling vision
of intellectual property, even within the TRIPS Agreement itself, was
endorsed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS:
We stress the importance we attach to implementation and interpretation
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
115. See Rosemary J. Coombe, "Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Sovereignty: New
Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and Conservation
of Biodiversity" (1998) 6 Indiana J. Global Legal Stud. 59 at 79 [Coombe, "New Dilemmas"]. See
also Van Fleet, "Protecting Knowledge" (2003 spring) Human Rights Dialogue, online: Carnegie
Council <www.cceia.org/resources/publications/dialogue/2_09/articles/942.html>; Oguamanam,
"Localizing," supra note 88 at 139 and 152.
116. The United States opposes the CBD Secretariat's application for observer status in the TRIPS
Council. See Heifer, "Human Rights," supra note 37 at 60-1. Such status would put the CBD in
a good position to explore areas of cooperation with TRIPS, for example, pursuant to the Doha
Declaration and other relevant resolutions of the U.N. Subcommittee on Human Rights. See, e.g.,
Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, resolutions 2000/7 and 2001/21;
Commission on Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, UN ESCOR, 2001, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 online: eldis <http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC5597.htm>. Human Rights and
Intellectual Property Issues: Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
E/C. 12/2001/15, 26 November 2001.
117. See, e.g., Coombe, "New Dilemmas," supra note 115; Heifer, "Human Rights," supra note
37; Audrey R. Chapman, "The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection"
(2002) 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 861; Christopher N. Kendall, "A Human Rights Approach to Intellectual
Property Protections?" (2002) 50 Intellectual Property Forum 2; Thomas F. Cotter, "Introduction to
IP Symposium: Intellectual Property, Development and Human Rights" (2002) 14 Fla. J. Int'l L. 147;
David Wiessbrodt & Kell Schoff, "A Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property Protection: The
Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7" (2003) 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 1.
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Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of public health,
by promoting both access to existing medicines and research and
development into new medicines and, in this connection, are adopting a
separate declaration." 8
IV. Plant genetic resources and farmers'rights: constraints on the
counter regime project
1. Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture
As with biodiversity/indigenous knowledge, the link between intellectual
property and PGRs received only limited attention prior to TRIPS." 9 Again,
as with biodiversity, research and development in the life sciences and the
resulting inventions, especially in the last half of the twentieth century,
heightened economic and commercial interest in PGRs. Historically, under
traditional intellectual property law, plant and other life forms were outside
the sphere of inventiveness and, by extension, private ownership. 12 0
In the developed countries, however, especially the United States,
that jurisprudence was fast becoming obsolete even by the early twentieth
century.' Nonetheless, the sacredness of life forms as subject matter
outside the reach of patent claims in indigenous communities and
developing countries has continued to hold sway. 2 Whilst developing
countries treated PGRs as public goods and part of the common heritage of
mankind, seed breeding corporations in industrialized countries exploited
118. WTO, Ministerial Conference (4" Session), Ministerial Declaration (adopted on 14 November
1991), WTO Dec.WT/M1N(01)/DEC/I, at para. 17, online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/minist e/min0l e/mindecl e.htm>.
119. See Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 27.
120. See Fritz Malchup, "An Economic Review of the Patent System" in United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary s Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights,
85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (S. Doc. No. 15) (arguing that intellectual property rights, especially patents,
from their evolution applied only to inventors of industrial or technical devices).
121. This occurred essentially in the prolonged debate between Europe and America over an
appropriate intellectual property regime for plant breeding activities. Several years of restraint in
Europe caved in as a result of the attempt to counteract the advantage posed by the U.S.'s lead in this
regard via its enactment of the Plant Patent Act, 1930. The Act applied only to asexually reproducing
plants and was directed mainly to the horticultural industries. It set the juridical framework for the
Plant Variety Protection Act, 1970 which provided for PBR for sexually reproducing plants. These
and subsequent similar legislation in European countries were national initiatives. An early attempt
to internationalize intellectual property protection in PGRs is conveniently located in the 1961 treaty
establishing the Union for Protection of New Plant Varieties, the UPOV, see supra note 81.
122. See generally Laurie Anne Whitt, "Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property and the New
Imperial Science" (1998) 23 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 211; Shubha Ghosh, "Traditional Knowledge,
Patents and the New Mercantilism" (2003) 85 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 828.
In their various resolutions, declarations and other public representations of their views, the world's
indigenous peoples and other local communities in the third world have opposed the patenting of life
forms and initiatives that privatize the commons and the public domain; see, e.g., Indigenous Peoples
Seattle 1999 Declaration on the occasion of the Third Ministerial Conference of the WTO, online:
International Public Health Watch <http://www.ldb.org/indi99.htm>.
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PGRs (in ex situ seed banks of the International Agricultural Research
Centres and other public seed repositories) obtained from centres of
biodiversity under the Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR)'23 programme. They did this by obtaining plant
breeders' rights (PBRs) - a proprietary and private ownership regime
over PGRs - and related intellectual property protection and in this way
effectively prevented the natural suppliers of PGRs from benefiting from
the seed banks.
Extending private ownership claims (essentially by plant breeders)
to PGRs, particularly through the instrumentality of the quasi-intellectual
property regime of PBRs, was championed by industrialized countries,
especially the United States. Changes in that country's statutory and case
law as early as the 1930s through the 1980s gradually brought PGRs,
as well as other life forms in general, within the ambit of intellectual
property protection and jurisprudence. Despite initial reluctance,
European resistance to the expansion of intellectual property rights to
PGRs and other life forms could not endure. In 1961, by virtue of the
treaty establishing UPOV,'24 PBRs were collectively endorsed by a group
of mainly industrialized countries and its scope of application extended
from the national sphere to international membership of the treaty.
Following progressive reviews and strengthening of UPOV and PBRs
as well as increases in the membership of UPOV, the regime of PBRs
is now consolidated within UPOV. Although many developed countries
have been coerced into UPOV, the treaty and its PBRs regime provide
a veritable framework for mostly industrialized countries with a head
start in plant breeding and agro-biotechnology in general to appropriate
PGRs in ex situ seed banks and generally to shortchange their developing
country counterparts who are major suppliers of global PGRs, including
those in the common pool.
Beyond UPOV, the TRIPS Agreement specifically sanctions the
notion of intellectual property protection over plant varieties. Article
27 stipulates in part that "[m]embers shall provide for the protection of
plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or
by any combination thereof.' 1 25 This provision has at least two relevant
implications to the present analysis. First, it marks a more expansive and
stronger regime of intellectual property protection for PGRs, including
123. CGIAR is the organization that manages ex situ collections of plant genetic resources, comprising
samples of genetic materials stored in gene banks for agricultural research, including plant breeding.
CGIAR was created by private and public sector collaboration.
124. See supra note 81.
125. TRIPS, supra note 3 at Art. 27(3)(b).
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patent or other unspecified options which constitute an "effective sui
generis system." TRIPS' scope transcends UPOV and embraces the
larger WTO member nations. Also, its provisions are subject to the WTO
enforcement and dispute resolution powers. Second, despite suggestions
to the contrary, TRIPS' provision for intellectual property protection over
PGRs is not necessarily equivalent to PBRs under UPOV. 2 6 However,
it marks a formal and most authoritative regime of protection for PGRs
in international intellectual property jurisprudence beyond the scope
contemplated under UPOV. Thus, TRIPS effectively strengthens, if not
escalates, the continued use of intellectual property rights to undermine
developing countries' stake in PGRs - a concern that predates TRIPS. The
latter's provision on PGRs provides impetus to pre-existing pressure for
equity in the allocation of benefits of PGRs.
Historically, key developing countries have continued to challenge the
unjust consequences of applying intellectual property, especially PBRs
in the PGRs arena, at the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture (FAO/CPGRFA). 2 7 Their efforts yielded a non-
binding International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture (IUPGRFA) 25 in 1983. That undertaking reaffirmed the
common heritage principle and required that for research, plant breeding,
and other useful purposes, parties should have access to all PGRs,
whether naturally occurring, cultivated, or in seed banks. 2 9 Clearly, the
vision of common heritage was in conflict with the underlying approach
of appropriation of PGRs under the UPOV regime. The apparent conflict
between IUPGRFA and UPOV was resolved in favour of UPOV through
an interpretive clarification in 1989, not of UPOV itself, but of IUPGRFA,
to the effect that PBRs under UPOV were adjudged compatible with the
common heritage principle. 130 This putative reconciliation "created an
imbalance in the [UPOV] regime, permitting unrestricted access only to
unimproved PGRs without requiring compensation to states, communities,
or institutions that maintained those resources" from which protected and
improved varieties were derived. 1 ' This yawning equity gap, which was
126. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
127. The FAO/CPGRFA is the principal forum for international negotiations on PGRs.
128. See International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Report
of the Conference of FAO, FAO Conference, 22d Sess., art. 1, U.N. Doc. C/83/REP (1983) online at:
<http://www.fao.org.ag/cgrfa/iu.htm> [IUPGRFA]. See also Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I
at 36 and n. 153.
129. See IUPGRFA, ibid. at Art. 1.
130. See FAO, Agreed Interpretation of the International Undertaking, Annex 1, Res. 4/89, FAO
Conference, 25th sess., para. 1 (1989) [FAO Conference]; Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at
36 and n. 157. See also McManis, "Thinking Globally," supra note 100, at 554-55.
131. See Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 36.
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further compounded by Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, gave rise to
demands for the recognition of farmers' rights in PGRs.
2. Farmers'rights
In order to address the inequity created by PBRs as elaborated in the last
section, developed countries opted for a revised IUPGRFA that provided
for, among others things, "farmers' rights," 132 a phrase credited to civil
society activist Carey Fowler.'33 Farmers' rights are articulated in terms of
the "rights arising from past, present and future contributions of farmers
in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources,
particularly those in the centres of origin/diversity." 34 Although the
jurisprudence behind farmers' rights remains inchoate and in need of
amplification, essentially, they are proposed as a "counterweight to plant
breeders' rights [under the UPOV model], compensating the upstream input
providers who make downstream innovations possible."'35 By extension,
farmers' rights are also a possible counterweight to other options for
intellectual property protection in the PGRs arena pursuant to Article 27
of TRIPS as those options are antithetical to the equitable allocation of
benefits of PGRs.
Farmers' rights are peculiar in several ways in comparison with other
heads of claims to intellectual property protection in that they incorporate
practices common to traditional farmers (and persons steeped in traditional
farming activities) all over the world, and they are not necessarily limited
to isolated individual farmers or groups. Categories of practices that fall
within farmers' rights are not closed and they may be region or culture
specific. Unlike most claims to intellectual property, farmers' rights are
132. See Annex II, FAO Conference, supra note 130, Res. 5/89 at 11-29. Other issues introduced
by further revisions included national sovereignty over PGRs (annex IIl 3/91, 26th sess. of FAO
Conference, Rome, Nov 1991) and a ban on claims for intellectual property protection for genetic
materials in seed banks. See also Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 37; McManis, "Thinking
Globally," supra note 100 at 554-55.
133. See Graham Dutfield, "The Role of Traditional Knowledge in International IP Diplomacy"
(Paper presented to the 2005 Annual Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Teaching
and Research in Intellectual Property, University of Montreal, July 12, 2005) [unpublished]. Dutfield
identifies Fowler and Pat Mooney of the then Rural Advancement International (RAFI) as the arrow
heads of the global agitation for farmers' rights as a bid to check the appropriation of PGRs in CGIAR
seed banks by transnational seed companies and private research agencies. See generally Cary Fowler
& Pat Mooney, Shattering: Food, Politics and the Loss of Genetic Diversity (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1990).
134. Farmers' Rights, Res. 5/89, FAO Conference, 2 5 1 Sess. (1989), cited in Heifer, "Regime
Shifting," supra note 1 at 37 and n. 158. These were almost the exact words used to articulate farmers'
rights in the 1983 IUPGRFA and the 2001 ITPGRFA (in article 9(1)).
135. Laurence R. Heifer, "Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Varieties: An Overview of Options for
National Governments" (FAO Legal Papers Online No. 31, 2002 at 9), online: Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations <http://www.fao.org/Legal/prs-01/years/2002/listO2.htm>, cited
in Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 37 and n. 159.
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presented as rights not to be restricted, but to be encouraged and open
to exploitation so long as those who benefit from them commit to their
sustainability and do not shut out the farmers who generate them. Users
of such rights do not need the consent of farmers to exploit the skills in
question. Finally, in so many ways, farmers' rights are forms of traditional
knowledge in form, content and, to some extent, context. For example,
they arise incrementally, derive essentially from traditional ecological/
biodiversity knowledge and are informal in nature. Indeed, farmers' rights
are encapsulated in the CBD's reference to "knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional
lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity."'
13 6
As part of their inherent conceptual indeterminacy, farmers' rights are
vested in the international community as a trust for existing and future
generations of farmers. This is done through the creation and management
of an international fund to promote activities falling under farmers' rights. 37
Because of the lack of interest by FAO members, especially those of the
industrialized stripe, the fund and its objectives were never realized.'
The TRIPS Agreement contains no provision on farmers' rights or
any correlating privileges. Rather, it provides for a regime that empowers
breeders' privatization of PGRs. Protection of PGRs via PBRs was already
entrenched in the intellectual property jurisprudence of many developed
countries before the advent of TRIPS.'39 To add insult to injury, TRIPS
prescribes the option of patent or effective sui generis protection or both
for PGRs140 and by that stroke rolls back the progress, if any, that was
made by the IUPGRFA revision of 1989. As if that did not suffice, the
revisions of 1991 to UPOV plugged the existing protections of what the
Convention characterized as "farmers' privilege" - a concept analogous
to farmers' rights - as one of the exceptions to PBRs.' 4' Before the 1991
revisions, farmers' privilege trumped breeders' rights. 42 By virtue of
farmers' privilege, breeders' rights did not extend to genes or principal
136. CBD, supra note 13 at Art. 8(j).
137. See Res 5/89 on IUPGRFA.
138. Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 37.
139. The earliest notable legislation was the Plant Patent Act, 1930 in the U.S., see supra note 121
and accompanying text. In Europe, related legislation dated to around the 1940s. For example, the
Netherlands enacted a Plant Breeding Ordinance in 1941 and Germany's law on the Protection of
Varieties and Seeds of Cultivated Plants was enacted in 1953. By the 1960s, most European States had
individual versions of the Plant Variety Protection legislation. See also Oguamanam, "Terminator,"
supra note 72 at 61 and n. 32.
140. See TRIPS, supra note 3 at Art. 27.
141. In addition to farmers' privilege, research and experimentation were second heads of exception
to PBR under UPOV.
142. See supra note 81.
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genetic materials to which farmers had access. 14 Farmers were allowed to
indulge in the age-long practices of using or replanting farm-saved seeds,
even if they were of protected varieties under PBRs. The latest revision
of UPOV radically rolls back farmers' privilege'" and replaces it with
an extended breeders' rights regime. 145 The same trend is reflected in the
national laws of member states of UPOV, which, as previously noted, has
had its ranks swollen in recent times by a significant number of developing
countries. 146
TRIPS's extension of intellectual property protection, including
potentially the PBRs model to PGRs, is insensitive to prevailing agricultural
philosophy and traditional farming practices in indigenous communities in
developing and developed countries alike. This insensitivity is compounded
by a more aggressive PBRs regime under the revised UPOV, which was
initiated by developed countries partly as a strategy to maximize the
benefits of developments in agricultural biotechnology. Arguably, in
retrospect, those revisions may have been aimed pre-emptively to take
full advantage of TRIPS. A logical consequence of this state of affairs
was that PGRs and their multiplier effect on agricultural biotechnology in
general became a new frontier in the counter regime trend to the TRIPS
Agreement. Meanwhile, the convergence of commercial agro-biotech
research, industrial and allied agrochemical production in a small number
of corporate strongholds, and their proprietary claims over PGRs and seeds
143. See C.S. Srinivisan & Collin Thirtle, "Impact of Terminator Technologies in Developing
Countries: A Framework for Economic Analysis" in R.E. Evenson, V. Santaniello & D. Zilberman,
eds., Economic and Social Issues in Agricultural Biotechnology (New York: Cabi, 2003) at 163.
144. However, it allows member countries the option to exempt farmers from the use of protected
genetic material for propagation purposes, insofar as the "legitimate interests of the breeder" are not
compromised. See UPOV, supra note 81 at Art. 15(2).
145. Breeders' rights now extend even to harvested material (where a breeder was not able to enforce
her right over propagating material) or varieties "essentially derived" from a protected one in order to
stem cosmetic breeding. In addition, PBR duration is extended to 20 years; however, trees and vines
have a longer duration of not less than 25 years. See Oguamanam, "Terminator," supra note 72 at
61-2. See also Srinivisan & Thirtle, supra note 143 at 164; UPOVsupra note 81 at art. 14(2).
146. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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have begun to raise questions about food security147 and the sustainability
of traditional farming practices, especially in developing countries.
48
In an attempt to address this threat and other issues relating to
appropriation of local agricultural knowledge, developing countries,
NGOs, civil society and intergovernmental organizations reached out to
FAO/CPGRFA and succeeded in making the latter an important part of the
multiple sites of resistance and counter-trend to the TRIPS Agreement. The
highpoint of their efforts is evident in the 2001 ITPGRFA 49 This treaty
has been a subject of scholarly scrutiny on many fronts since its inception.
Details of the debate surrounding it are outside the scope of this paper. 5°
For present purposes, it is important to note that the treaty is a major leap
from its precursor, the IUPGRFA, in that it incorporates farmers' rights, in
their most authoritative juridical elaboration, into a binding instrument, at
least theoretically.'5 ' That seems to be as far as it goes.
3. Juridical constraint on farmers 'rights and prospects for a unified
approach
In Article 9.2 ITPGRFA provides:
The Contracting Parties recognize that the responsibility for realizing
Farmers' Rights, as they relate to plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture, rests with national governments. In accordance with their
needs and priorities, each Contracting Party should, as appropriate, and
subject to its national legislation, take measures to protect and promote
Farmers' Rights
147. The six biggest global life sciences corporations, namely, Monsanto, Astra-Zeneca, Dow,
Novartis, Dupont, AgrEvo, through a spate of mergers, take-overs and acquisitions, have capitalized
on the convergence of crop biotechnology with agrochemical and seed production. These corporations
and their subsidiaries are based in the industrialized countries of Europe and North America. See
Srinivasan & Thirtle, supra note 143 at 168.
148. Judicial decisions in Canada and the United States since the 1980s have continued to chisel down
the traditional 'right' of farmers to replant farm-saved seed and to indulge in other privileges associated
with traditional farming. See, e.g., Delta and Pine Land Company v. Peoples Gin Company, 694 F.2d
1012 (5th Cir. 1983) (eroding commercial transaction in farm-saved seeds); Asgrow v. Winterboer,
11 S. Ct. 788 (1995) (limiting the amount of farm-saved seed permissible); Monsanto Canada Inc
v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R 902 (holding that the use of a seed bearing patented gene to raise an
unpatentable product (crop) is a breach of patent, even if no profit resulted from the exercise). See
also Oguamanam, "Terminator," supra note 72 at 62-3; Peter J. Goss, "Guiding the Hand that Feeds:
Toward Socially Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation" (1996) 84 Cal.
L. Rev. 1395 at 1411-1423; Jeremy P. Oczek, "In the Aftermath of the "Terminator" Technology
Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds and the Right to Save
and Replant Seed" (2000) 41 B.C.L. Rev. 627 at 639.
149. See supra note 14.
150. See, e.g., Laurence Heifer, "Intellectual Property Rights and the International Treaty on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture" (2003) 97 Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 33.
151. Notably, the treaty abandoned the common heritage of mankind approach. However, it identifies
its objectives in a manner akin to those of the CBD. See McManis, "Thinking Globally," supra note
100 at 555.
152. Supra note 14 at Art. 9.2 [emphasis added].
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Article 9.3 adds an emphatic rider to the effect that "[n]othing in this Article
shall be interpreted to limit any rights farmers have to save, use, exchange,
and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law and
as appropriate."'53 The combined effects of these provisions are that states
can promote farmers' rights in accordance with their national priorities.
But such efforts must respect pre-existing national law. Given that the
underlying motivation for farmers' rights is to serve as a counterweight
to PBRs or other intellectual property options applicable to PGRs, an
effective farmers' rights' regime would not serve the interests of countries
with advanced agro-biotech and plant breeding cultures. 15 4 In these
countries, PBRs of the UPOV standard are part of national law which must
trump farmers' rights, even as the TRIPS Agreement throws open further
protection options. The continued co-option' of developing countries,
through the backdoor of TRIPS-plus bargains, toward the adoption of
the UPOV PBRs scheme is not promoting their national priorities, which
favour the protection of farmers' rights. In addition, developed countries
have continued to insist that the standard of PBRs required by TRIPS
ought to be the UPOV standard.1
6
It is certainly arguable that, of the several fronts in the counter regime
trend and resistance to the TRIPS Agreement, the farmers' rights initiative
is the one most in need of rigorous scrutiny and interrogation if it is to
have any meaningful impact on the needs and priorities of its proponents.
Under the prevailing juridical framework, farmers' rights are stymied. An
alternative would be to collapse the claim to farmers'rights with the broader
claim for the protection of local knowledge under the more developed
153. Ibid. at Art. 9.3 [emphasis added].
154. For instance, after initial reluctance, the United States signed the ITPGRFA on November 6,
2002 as the 76th State to do so but it is definitely not in a hurry to ratify the treaty. The seeming ease
with which other industrialized countries signed and ratified this treaty is not unconnected to the
understanding that the treaty made commitment to farmer's rights subject to national priorities. For
virtually all of these countries national priorities privilege PBRs over farmers' rights.
155. As part of its strategy to make UPOV attractive to developing countries, the UPOV Secretariat
represents UPOV's PBR regime as the lesser of two evils in allusion to the potential introduction
of terminator technology as a technological alternative to intellectual property in the plant breeding
arena. See Etc Group, "Who Calls the Shot at Upov?" online: <http://www.mindfully.org/GE/2003/
UPOV-Terminator-Technology 17apr03.htm>.
156. This is a reference to TRIPS' use of the phrase "effective sui generis system" as a third option
of protection applicable to plant varieties pursuant to art. 27(3)(b). See Sell, supra note 84 at 205,
(arguing that TRIPS' provision for effective sui generis protection does not necessarily require a UPOV
PBR protection standard). Cf Dan Leskien & Michael Flitner, "Intellectual Property Rights In Plant
Genetic Resources: Options For A Sui Generis System" (1997) Issues in Plant Genetic Resources,
online: Bioversity International <http://www.ipgri.cgiar.org/publications/pdf/497.pdf> (arguing that
what is required under TRIPS' effective sui generis option for plant variety protection is practically a
patent-like right).
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biodiversity initiative.'57 Indeed, Article 1 of ITPGRFA articulates the
treaty's objectives as conservation and sustainable use of PGRs and
equitable sharing of its benefits in consonance with CBD. 55 Farmers'
rights, as outlined under ITPGRFA, fit squarely within contemplation
of Article 80) of CBD, which is the heart of that regime's provision for
protection of local knowledge. Thus, the campaign for entrenchment of
farmers' rights is perhaps better explored via multiple fronts, including
CBD. Aside from not being fettered by numerous qualifications found
in ITPGRFA, under CBD, farmers' rights are a logical part of numerous
CBD friendly national laws and other initiatives around Article 80).
Although not immune from the conflicts in the international legal regime
that ITPGRFA sought to avoid, CBD is gradually evolving or influencing
more unifying responses to the protection of local knowledge159 which
could be helpful in fashioning a unifying framework for diverse sites of
counter regime trends in intellectual property. Besides, since CBD came
into effect there has been willingness by stakeholders to recognize the
inherent tension between it and the WTO/TRIPS Agreement, even though
an acceptable resolution of such tension is far from sight. 6 °
The criticism of farmers' rights may apply to some degree in regard
to the elaboration of intellectual property in other arenas, such as public
health and human rights. The conceptual challenges in the elaboration of
intellectual property in these counter regime arenas are hardly surprising.
The often divergent and conflicting emphases and interests among
developing countries,' 6' various indigenous and local communities,
and even NGOs and other intergovernmental organizations associated
with these counter regime movements fuel the extant regime tension in
the intellectual property arena.' 62 The economic power, political clout,
157. The downside of this approach is that the claim to farmers' rights is not limited to indigenous
and local communities in the developing countries, but it extends to all smallholder farmers who are
steeped in useful traditional farming practices, whatever they may be and wherever such farmers
may be. However, in some ways, traditional knowledge depicts universal epistemological phenomena
distinct from formal science and is not limited to any geographical domain.
158. See CBD, supra note 13 at Art. 1.
159. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
161. See Maskus & Reichman, "Globalization," supra note 12 at 27 (decrying the disorganized
institutional apparatus in the developing countries and their inability to effectively participate in norm
formation).
162. Because of historical and political differences, various claimants to indigenous knowledge, for
instance, approach the subject with different emphasis. See Coombe, "Indigenous People," supra
note 104 at 277; see also Oguamanam, "Protecting Indigenous Knowledge," supra note 103 at
213; Dutfield, supra note 133. Because developing countries are at different stages of technological
development, they do not approach intellectual property issues from a uniform front, even though they
share common interests in many of the issues. Similarly, because of their underlying ideologies and
interests, NGOs also differ in the emphases they bring to the intellectual property discourse.
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organizational efficiency, and general cohesiveness'63 of transnational
corporate lobbies and their developed country state agents that have
influenced the regime shift in international intellectual property from
the pre-TRIPS WIPO framework 64 are hardly matched by the inherent
divergences in the constituencies that promote counter regime trends.
In addition, sponsors of conventional intellectual property, even
in the trade arena, operate from a position of advantage. They have
the benefit of established conventions and supporting institutional and
normative structures. Those that link intellectual property rights to hitherto
unrecognized arenas confront established, albeit parochial, orthodoxy on
highly contested grounds. However, in "challenging established legal
prescriptions" toward the generation of new norms and principles of
intellectual property, they have not been without results.165 Evidence of this
includes the failed attempts to implement gradated transition to TRIPS in
accordance with its original timetable for developing and least developed
countries. Others are the repeatedly botched attempts to review the TRIPS
Agreement, a process that began with the 1999 WTO third ministerial
meeting in Seattle, the 2001 Doha Declarations, and the 2003 collapsed
Canclln summit as well as subsequent stalled proceedings in the trade
negotiation committees of the WTO. Indications are that even though
developed countries have had their way in relocating intellectual property
to the trade arena, developing countries are having their say on the way
forward, as they elaborate an alternative vision of intellectual property that
would address social welfare concerns.
The linking of intellectual property to biodiversity and indigenous
knowledge, PGRs, public health, and human rights has received more
than passing mention in many important fora, including but not limited to
CBD, FAO, UNCTAD, WHO, UNESCO and WIPO, and in the continued
163. It is not claimed that developed countries have always formed a common front in intellectual
property negotiations. Even as between the U.S., the EU and Japan, there are areas of disagreement on
intellectual property. Indeed, Japan and the EU were not original enthusiasts or converts to the TRIPS
Agreement and its underlying philosophy. See Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra
note 5 at 196. However, developed countries' common interests in a stronger intellectual property
regime in a trade arena have remained the trump card that propels compromise and a united front on
many issues.
164. The push to bring intellectual property under the WTO Agenda and the resulting TRIPS Agreement
is credited, for the most part, to powerful private sector CEOs, especially those of U.S. transnational
pharmaceutical corporations. See generally Drahos & Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note
5. See also Sell, Private Power, supra note 91. See generally Gervais, supra note 23.
165. See Helfer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 6.
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elaboration of the International Bill of Rights at the United Nations.'66 The
following observation succinctly underlines this trend:
The few short years since TRIPS entered into force have seen nothing
less than an explosion of interest in intellectual property issues in a broad
array of international fora. Intellectual property issues are now at or near
the top of the agenda in intergovernmental organizations such as the
World Health Organization and the Food and Agricultural Organization,
in international negotiating fora such as the Convention on Biodiversity's
Conference of the Parties and the Commission on Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture, and in expert and political bodies such as the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission
on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights.'67
These agencies have continued to collaborate in the exposition and critical
exploration of the role of intellectual property in relation to the four major
fronts of the counter regime movement which were discussed in Parts III
and IV
With regard to WIPO, in the wake of TRIPS that organization has
tactfully collaborated with the WTO to facilitate the negotiation of new
TRIPS-friendly treaties in response both to the demands of the trade-
based ideology of global intellectual property governance, as well as to
the demands of digital technology.16 It also promotes intellectual property
manpower training and legislative and policy support in developing
countries, assisting them to establish structures to meet their TRIPS
commitment. 169 Nonetheless, even though there is no consensus among
166. See Commission on Human Rights, Access to medication in the context of pandemics such as
HIVAIDS, Res 2001/33, UN ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CN/.4/RES/2001/33 para. 3(b)(2001) (sponsored
by Brazil, safeguarding access to medications against third party imposed limitations). See also Access
to Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, Res 2002/2000 (2000); Access to
Medication in the Context of Pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, Res. 2003/29, U.N. Comm'n. on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L. l/Add.3 (2003).
167. See Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note 1 at 6.
168. Since TRIPS, WIPO has supervised the negotiation of a number of treaties that reflect the new
trade-based orientation of intellectual property: see, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty (1997) 36 I.L.M.
65; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, (1997) 36 I.L.M. 76; Geneva Act of the Hague
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs (2 July 1999), online:
WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/hague/en/legal_ texts/wo haa t.htm>. WIPO's Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names or Numbers (ICANN) is one of four global initiatives against cyber-squatting. In
2002, WIPO completed a procedural Patent Law Treaty and a Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty,
online: WIPO. See Salmon, supra note 56 at 435-36.
169. WIPO has an elaborate training program that targets developing countries, conducted within and
outside those countries. WIPO's virtual Intellectual Property Worldwide Academy is an example of
the organization's commitment to use available technologies to reach its entire global constituency,
online: WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/academy/en>. Insight on WIPO professional training program
is available online at: <http://www.wipo.int/academy/en/courses/professional_training/>. See also
Salmon, supra note 55 for overview of WIPO training and legislative assistance to developing
countries.
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commentators, 70 WIPO has not undermined its historic and dedicated
support for strategic positioning of developing countries to enable them to
exploit intellectual property in advancing their national interests pursuant
to the 1974 agreement.
For instance, WIPO has not relented in the review of the WIPO-
UNESCO Model Provisions on National Laws on Expression of Folklore
against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions. 7 ' This is
an initiative that predates the counter regime movement. It is now a
key subject of the mandate of WIPO's Intergovernmental Committee
on Genetic Resources Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (IGC-
GRTKFL),7 2 a forum for the exploration of indigenous knowledge and
related issues at WIPO. 173 In addition, the report of WIPO's 1998-99
celebrated Fact Finding Missions'74 under its Global Intellectual Property
Issues Program has provided the framework in which WIPO continues
to elaborate policy agendas on indigenous or local knowledge, a matter
that is critical for developing countries in the context of the debate for the
evolution of a globally acceptable intellectual property regime. It is to the
credit of that organization that it has not only survived the regime coup in
intellectual property regulation pulled by TRIPS,'75 but that it has also not
lost its relevance in mediating tense and conflicting intellectual property
170. See Heifer, "Regime Shifting," supra note I at 26 (arguing that developing countries still
retain their influence in post-TRIPS WIPO). See also Pamela Samuelson, "The U.S. Digital Agenda
at WIPO" (1997) 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 369 at 388-90 (on Africa's influence over the 1996 WIPO
Copyright Treaty); Cheek, supra note I at 314-315 (arguing that WIPO's sponsorship of regional
caucus meetings strengthens developing countries to counterbalance the influence of industrialized
countries under the aegis of the Stockholm Group in post-TRIPS WIPO processes). Cf Drahos and
Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, supra note 5 at 195 (charging that WIPO drafted TRIP-plus laws
for developing countries).
171. Reprinted in 16 Copyright Bulletin 62 (1982). For insight on the Model Law, see Folarin Shyllon,
"Conservation, Preservation and Legal Protection of Folklore in Africa: A General Survey" (1998) 4
Copyright Bulletin 37. See also Oguamanam, "Localizing," supra note 88 at 160-162 and n. 106.
172. WIPO'S IGC-GRTKFL was established at the 26th Session of WIPO General Assembly in 2000
as a forum for member states to hold discussions on a number of agenda items, including access and
benefit sharing, protection of traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore. See also McManis,
"Thinking Globally," supra note 100 at 557.
173. See WIPO IGC-GRTKFL, Final Report on National Experiences With the Legal Protection of
Expressions of Folklore, online: WIPO <http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/
grtkfic3_ 10.pdf>.
174. See World Intellectual Property Organizations (WIPO), Report on Fact-Finding Missions on
Intellectual and Traditional Knowledge (1998-1999) (Geneva, April 2001), online: WIPO <http://
wipoint/tk/en/tk/ffm/report/index.html>. This report explored and made recommendations on the
intellectual property needs and expectations of traditional knowledge holders.
175. According to Cheek, WIPO's willingness both to partly cede its secretariat's (the International
Bureau) policy making control powers and to moderate the structure of draft treaty negotiations to
accommodate post-TRIPS pressures from industrialized countries prevented the latter from exploring
an alternative institutional structure to WIPO. See Cheek, supra note 1 at 318. See also supra note 170
and accompanying text.
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expectations as between developed and developing countries within the
room left for it by the TRIPS Agreement.'76
Conclusion
Apart from re-igniting the debate over the place of social issues in
international economic policy more than a decade after intellectual
property became a subject of international trade law, it is unclear to
what extent the expectations of the architects of that initiative have been
satisfied. Admittedly, most of the ten year-plus period falls within the
transition phase of the TRIPS Agreement and does not afford adequate
time for appraisal. Nonetheless, the surprises occasioned by the TRIPS
Agreement so far are the unsuspected emancipations that have trailed it.
An agreement that, in its provisions, deliberately undermines the social
and public welfare concerns that must legitimately be incorporated in an
intellectual property regime has ironically served as a catalyst not only for
generating intense debate about the accommodation of those concerns, but
also for raising awareness about the need to extend intellectual property
policy discourse into arenas not envisaged by TRIPS.
However, attempts to foist a counter-TRIPS agenda on the WTO's
international intellectual property outlook have been faced with those
difficulties that normally arise in counter-hegemonic contexts. This is
evident in the example of farmers' rights and PGRs, especially under
ITPGRFA and to some extent UPOV. Challenging established orthodoxy
from understandably less empowered and inherently less cohesive
constituencies takes the appearance of a rebellion motivated by the god of
defeat. But surprises could be sweet, especially in less expected scenarios,
even if they are unaccompanied by any clear victory. TRIPS aims at a
maximal exploitation of the trade potential of intellectual property and,
consequently, at a permanent shift of its jurisprudence to the trade arena.
But this aim has unwittingly moved intellectual property jurisprudence in
a direction not contemplated by its proponents, forcing it to reconsider the
erosion of social interest aspects of that jurisprudence and the shrinking of
public policy space that has trailed the TRIPS Agreement.
For instance, even though the agitations for farmers' rights preceded
the TRIPS Agreement, they are bolstered by it. Despite the constraining
juridical framework for elaboration of those rights, especially under
176. WIPO and WTO have a cooperation agreement that enables WIPO to provide manpower and
lawmaking assistance on intellectual property to both WTO and WIPO Member States. The agreement
capitalizes on WIPO's pre-existing expertise in an attempt to avoid duplicating its role within the
WTO. This enables WIPO to remain effective in its original role, as tempered by the changed
dynamics in international intellectual property law. See Debra P. Steger, "Afterword The "Trade
and..." Conundrum - A Commentary" (2002) 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 135.
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ITPGRFA and UPOV, it is possible to further the push for farmers' rights
through multiple avenues, incorporating the more established CBD
framework's policy space in regard to the protection or "preservation of
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities
embodying traditional life styles." That avenue itself is a warrant for
the prominence traditional knowledge and biodiversity-related issues
have attained as a firm site of the counter regime trend in international
intellectual property post-TRIPS. Clearly, farmers' rights encapsulate
traditional agricultural practices as aspects of the knowledge of indigenous
and local communities.

